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In early January, President Ernesto Zedillo's administration was forced to draft an emergency
economic plan to help counter the effects of a sudden, sharp devaluation of the peso that took place
in the last week of December. The emergency plan which was drafted after 20 hours of consultations
among representatives of the government, labor unions, and the business sector primarily aims to
prevent inflation in Mexico from spiraling out of control as a result of a 30% devaluation of national
currency in late December. The central components of the plan call on business and labor to hold
down wages and prices, while committing the government to reduce its expenditures. Under the
plan, labor unions have agreed to limit their requests for wage hikes to a maximum of 7% for 1995,
which would include a 4% salary increase, plus up to 3% in productivity bonuses.
For their part, businesses have accepted a moratorium on price increases, except for "justifiable"
price adjustments on imported products. The government, in turn, has agreed to lower some taxes
for businesses as an incentive to abide by the price moratorium. In addition, the government
will work to lower the fiscal deficit through two measures. On the one hand, the government
will attempt to boost revenue by expediting the privatization of petrochemical plants, port
administration, and electric generating plants. On the other hand, the government promises to
lower the total amount it spends this year by an equivalent of 1.3% of GDP. However, Zedillo went
to great lengths to reassure Mexicans that the reduction in government spending will not affect
social programs that benefit the poorest segments of society.
While these measures are crucial to keep inflation under control, a massive injection of foreign aid
from the US and elsewhere will also provide an essential crutch for the government to prop up the
peso and stabilize the exchange rate. On Jan. 2, the US government announced plans to open a US
$9 billion credit line for peso stabilization efforts, or one-half of the total US$18 billion in promised
international support. The other large-scale contributor is the Swiss-based Bank for International
Settlements, which offered about US$5 billion in potential loans. Another US$1 billion will be
provided by Canada, while a number of international commercial banks, including some institutions
based in the US such as Citibank, have offered an additional US$3 billion. The governments and
central banks of France and Japan are also considering contributions to an international fund to help
stabilize the peso. Devaluation was considered inevitable by most economists
The devaluation of the peso was not entirely unexpected, since Mexico continues to face an
oppressive current account deficit, which reached US$28 billion in 1994. The current account deficit,
in turn, has been fed by a massive trade deficit, which has widened because imports have risen at a
faster rate than exports. One of the effects of the devaluation will be to increase the cost of imports
and boost exports, which in turn will help reduce the trade deficit, which was reported at US$13.7
billion in January-September 1994, compared with about US$10.4 billion in the same time period the
year before (see SourceMex, 12/07/94). In fact, in announcing the economic plan on Jan. 3, Zedillo
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said one of his goals is to reduce the current account deficit to about US$14 billion by the end of
1995, primarily by reducing the trade deficit. However, many analysts believe this goal is overly
optimistic.
Another factor behind the devaluation has been the government's inability to attract sufficient
foreign capital to government securities, despite offering relatively attractive interest rates. Many
foreign investors have been reluctant to acquire short-term securities because of continuing political
instability in Mexico, which includes the unresolved conflict with the Zapatista National Liberation
Army (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional, EZLN) in Chiapas and the still-unanswered
questions over the assassinations of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and governing
party official Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu. In fact, according to the daily newspaper El Economista,
Mexico will face the threat of "foreign exchange insolvency" in early 1995 if private investors
withdraw more than US$10.3 billion in Treasury Bonds (Tesobonos) that are due to expire in the
January-March quarter of the year. That amount represents about one-third of the total of US$29.9
billion invested in Tesobonos. According to El Economista, roughly half of the money invested in
Tesobonos was placed by foreign investors.
Still, some economists blame former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari for pursuing economic
policies that left the peso overvalued. The economists suggest Salinas deliberately delayed a muchneeded devaluation until after he left office. The peso devaluation actually came in two stages, first
through a decision to raise by 15% the level at which the government would intervene to support
the currency, and later by allowing the peso to float freely against the US dollar. The first stage,
announced on Dec. 20, lasted only one day. On that date, then finance minister Jaime Serra Puche
announced that the Zedillo administration would discontinue the Salinas administration's policy
of supporting the Mexican currency at a level of 3.46 pesos per dollar. Under Salinas, whenever the
peso approached that level, the Banco de Mexico (central bank) would buy pesos and sell US dollars
in order to prop up the Mexican currency.
In contrast, the Zedillo administration decided to raise the intervention level to 4.00 per dollar.
The decision to abandon the policy of propping the peso at the 3.46 level came after the Central
Bank was forced to spend an estimated US$4 billion of its reserves during a 2-day period on Dec.
19-20. The move backfired, however, since the devaluation caused massive speculative selling
of the peso on the foreign exchange markets. In response, on Dec. 21 the Zedillo administration
was forced into the second stage, announcing plans to abandon the policy of intervening in the
market to support the peso and allowing the Mexican currency to float freely against the dollar for 60
days. Along with this decision, business and labor representatives agreed not to seek price or wage
increases during the 60-day period. This agreement, however, was superseded by the emergency
economic plan announced on Jan. 3. Low-income groups will bear the brunt of austerity According
to columnist Aurora Berdejo Arvizu of the daily newspaper Excelsior, the hardest task for the Zedillo
administration during the negotiations on the emergency economic plan, which lasted 20 hours,
was convincing labor representatives to accept a new limit on salary increases. Analysts say that the
labor sector at first staunchly opposed the limits on salaries since the agreed-to wage hikes will fall
far short of the anticipated rate of inflation for 1995, which has been adjusted to 16% because of the
devaluation.
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Jesus Ramones Saldana, an economist with the Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon in
Monterrey, told the Dallas Morning News that the devaluation will create hardships especially for
lower-income workers in Mexico. "A currency devaluation means the erosion of purchasing power,"
he said. For his part, analyst Sergio Sarmiento of the daily newspaper Reforma agreed that the antiinflation plan is very fragile, since workers many of whom failed to benefit from the market-opening
measures under former president Salinas are unlikely to accept the further "sacrifices" requested by
Zedillo. "I don't think Mexico can avoid a wage and price spiral," Sarmiento said.
The plan also contains a tax reduction of 3% for the working poor, but many analysts suggest this
is insufficient to offset the impact of the devaluation on the majority of the Mexican population.
The agreement to limit price increases also appears to be in danger, especially since a growing
number of manufactured products in Mexico rely on foreign components, which will become more
expensive with the devaluation. Nevertheless, the government's consumer protection agency
(Procuraduria Federal de Proteccion al Consumidor) has started to crack down on retailers who
violate the moratorium on price increases. In the days following the devaluation, many retailers in
Mexico City had raised prices despite the government-ordered 60-day freeze on prices. According
to the Dallas Morning News, the items with higher price tags were domestic appliances, electronics,
clothes, furniture and food, all of which were items in high demand during the Christmas season.

US investors fearful of the consequences of devaluation
Meantime, US retailers in cities bordering Mexico were clearly concerned about the repercussions
for their businesses, since the devaluation has reduced the purchasing power of Mexicans who
shop at US stores. The effect of the devaluation on US merchants in communities near the Mexican
border was not expected to be known for a few weeks, however, since sales were brisk just before
Christmas. Certain US retail operations in Mexico, such as Wal-Mart and K-Mart department stores,
are also expected to feel the impact of the devaluation, since many of the products on their shelves
are imported from the US and will now be sold at higher prices. Finally, the devaluation has forced
the Mexican government to change forecasts for the Mexican economy for 1995.
As late as mid-December, the Zedillo administration was projecting consumer price inflation and
GDP growth both at 4%. On Jan. 3, however, President Zedillo announced that those forecasts
have been modified to project an inflation rate of 16% and GDP growth of 1.5% to 2%. Most private
analysts concur that inflation could be limited to the 16% rate projected by the administration if
the emergency economic plan announced on Jan. 3 succeeds. However, some analysts warn that
if controls on consumer prices and wage increases fail, then the inflation rate could climb as high
as 25%. (Sources: El Financiero, 12/21/94; La Jornada, 12/26/94; Dallas Morning News, 12/23-25/94,
12/28/94; El Economista, 12/28/94; Spanish news service EFE, 12/30/94; Agence France-Presse,
12/21-23/94, 12/26-30/94, 01/01/95, 01/02/95; El Financiero International, 12/26/94, 01/02/95; New
York Times, 12/21/94, 12/29/94, 01/03/95; Notimex, 01/01- 03/95; Associated Press, 01/02/95, 01/03/95;
Reforma, Excelsior, 01/03/95)
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